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This paper analyzes the reaction of teachers’ and doctors’ unions to a series of social sector
reforms in the region, including administrative decentralization, provider payment mechanisms,
and the introduction of performance evaluation and private provision. It combines the literature
of economics and political science to understand the conditions that shape different patterns of
union behavior and their effect on policy implementation. The paper suggests that the main
conditions influencing union behavior in the health sector  are related to the structure of the
market (size and level of competition) due to the predominance of the private-public mix in its
employment. In education, where the public sector is the main employer, political alignments
and the organizational features of teachers’ associations also play an important role in explaining
the behavior of providers’ organizations. Considering the exogenous character of most of these
variables, the paper concludes by making some policy suggestions to align the objectives of
unions and policymakers through regulatory reforms.
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Introduction
During the 1990s, Latin America experienced a vast array of social sector reforms in an attempt
to improve coverage and service quality. Many analysts assumed the resistance of social service
providers as part of the entrenched interests that would be affected by reforms (Inter-American
Development Bank, 1996). This paper, instead, tries to illuminate the variables affecting the
different interactions between providers’ organizations and reforming governments. It argues
that the key variable for understanding this interaction in the health sector is market structure. In
the case of education, political alignments and the organization of providers also played an
important role. Because these variables are exogenous for policymakers, our policy suggestions
are based on regulatory decisions that can shape the interaction observed as well as markets in
health care and education. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the
context of social sector reforms and the characteristics of providers’ organizations. The second
section presents our theoretical framework. The third section uses this theoretical framework to
illuminate a set of empirical experiences in both sectors, and the last section summarizes our
findings and proposes some policy suggestions.
1  Historical Background and Organizational Context
During the approximately forty-year period from the end of the Second World War until the
1980s the world gross national product tripled.  The global recession, the rise in real interest rates
and the declining terms of trade for the exports of debtor economies produced a global debt crisis
and a severe threat to the integrity of the international financial system in the 1980s (Gilpin,
1987). Latin America, as a region, was hard-hit by the debt crisis and the recession of the “lost”
decade. In particular, the public debt contributed to fiscal crises that undermined the basic
functions of the state. Like other developing countries, and under the supervision of multilateral
organizations, Latin American countries carried out structural adjustment packages mandating
severe cuts in government spending to balance budgets, eliminating trade barriers and social
subsidies, tightening monetary policies, devaluing currencies, and dismantling barriers to foreign
investment.
Although these policies were relatively successful at the macroeconomic level (i.e.,
reduced price instability, opening of the economy to more competitive products, and limited6
fiscal deficits), they could not cope with the crisis of the public sector. In particular, the state was
unable to provide a safety net to compensate for the cost of adjustment among different income
groups and its provision of social services deteriorated. In addition to the public sector crisis, the
region suffered chronic problems with inequality, and many analysts argue that expenditures in
health and education services were slower to improve the social welfare of large sections of the
population than in other regions of the world (Mahon, 1992; McGuire 1995), while others
considered these services to be of low quality (Inter-American Development Bank, 1996). As a
result, since the beginning of the 1990s, Latin American countries, like many other developing
nations, found themselves involved in a second round of structural reforms, this time related to
the reorganization of their social sectors, especially health care and education.
These reforms sought to expand the coverage of social services while assuring the
sustainability of their provision. Toward this end, many Latin American countries started
decentralization programs, and demand-driven social sector financing schemes, where cost
recovery aspects were often included. The reforms sought to modify the incentives of social
sector providers assuming that the traditional payment structure did not trigger the allocation of
scarce resources in a cost-effective manner. Therefore, they tried to change remuneration
methods based on fixed wages for health and education workers and historic budgets for schools
and hospitals by performance-based payment models, such as capitation and per-case payments
in the case of health care, and vouchers or other performance-based payment methods in
education. In the case of capitation, a defined payment is associated with the provision of a
basket of health care services to a patient or group of patients. It promotes cost containment and,
under certain conditions, preventive care and good quality standards. In the case of inpatient
care, health interventions can be paid according to a per case mode, where each participant
health care procedure within a health intervention is priced, with the additional goal of
promoting cost containment. In all cases, reforms involving payment methods look for reducing
information asymmetries unfavorable to consumers and payers, and they may enforce the role of
demand in the allocation of resources (i.e., managed care in health, vouchers in education).
1
The technical justification for these reforms is based on three postulates. First, the
separation of financing and provision of services creates cross controls in the management of
                                                       
1 Cost reduction plus competition among providers contributes to keep good quality standards in the provision of
services at the same time that it allows a better allocation of resources. This, from the social perspective, improves
cost-effectiveness in the use of funds.7
funds because the concentration of resources and social services infrastructure under the same
authority reduces the probability of effective monitoring of performance. In the cases of mixed
supply of social services (public and private facilities), the separation of functions potentially
allows a more effective use of the available physical and human capacities, by allowing public
financiers to subcontract private services in locations where public facilities do not exist, and
vice versa. Second, decentralization creates incentives to align the allocation of resources with
population needs. The reasons are that the lack of interaction between the decision-maker and the
target population can reduce the effectiveness of any policy intervention, in terms of the
identification of the needs, selection of target groups, and timing of intervention by centralized
bureaucratic structures. Hence, the reforms would increase the “voice” of consumers by
enhancing their participation in the organization of services to make them more responsive.
Finally, these reforms would enlarge the “exit” options of consumers by allowing competition
among alternative suppliers of social services.
2
In the context of fiscal crises experienced in the region, the decline in the delivery of
services can galvanize public opinion, pushing them to demand policy changes while increasing
the distrust of providers who fear that these reforms aim at cutting expenditures rather than
improving quality. Hence, fiscal crises can serve as an incentive for reforms because they
constrain  resources and often affect the delivery of services while highlighting the cost
inefficiencies in their provision.
3 However, fiscal crises also increase the distrust of providers
whose real incomes are declining and makes equity and efficiency reforms more difficult to
accomplish. Even with financial assistance from multilateral organizations to pay for the
transitional costs of reforms, only an adequate fiscal reform can make a credible commitment of
linking institutional innovations and income improvement for providers. Hence, fiscal deficits
have a double effect. On the one hand, they create incentives for policymakers to make reforms
that are cost-effective. On the other hand, they increase providers’ fear that reforms are merely a
cost-cutting mechanism that would reduce their income.
In a context of fiscal constraint, providers fear the effect of reforms on their income and
work conditions as well as on issues associated with labor stability, tenure and promotion. Due to
                                                       
2 Hirschman (1970) analyzes the alternative uses of “exit” through the market and “voice” through the political
system for the improvement of publicly provided services.
3 Bates (1984) and Weyland (1998) analyze the effect of fiscal crisis in generating incentives for reform among
politicians in the developing world.8
the labor-intensive character of many education and health services, the cooperation of providers
is key in improving their performance. Hence, the organizations of providers, which represent
the participating labor force in the provision of health and education services in the public sector,
are key actors for the political economy of reforms. To understand the challenges created for
these actors and their reactions, it is necessary to start with a brief description of their
characteristics.
1.1  Social Service Providers as Public Sector Unions
Most services in education and a significant proportion of health care services are provided by
the public sector. Therefore, the organizations of health and education providers share the
characteristics of public sector unions in addition to the features peculiar to their specific sectors.
The public sector is different from the private sector in that its labor relations are usually more
politicized and influenced by legal developments because the employer is the state (Freeman,
1986).
In this context, two conditions have driven public sector unions in the region towards
political rather than industrial strategies.  First, most countries in the region have limitations on
collective bargaining and on the right to strike in the public sector despite International Labour
Organization Resolution No. 151.
4 Second, the public sector in most countries of the region has
suffered from the politicization of appointments, even in professional services like those
analyzed in this paper. The discretion of the government in controlling human resources along
with the political volatility of the region contributed to this politicization. As a result of both
factors, most countries of the region implemented by law rule-bound measures defining work
conditions, promotions, and remuneration for social service workers in the public sector. For the
most part, these statutes included job stability to avoid the risk of political discretion and to
promote professional criteria.
5  Because  these rules are defined by the Congress or the
                                                       
4 Limitations on collective bargaining in the public sector have resulted in the regulation of labor relations by
legislation in the form of statutes and restrictions on legal strike activity, which usually includes rules regarding
dismissal, payment of lost days, and replacement of employees. The absence of collective bargaining contracts and
their replacement by legislation moves the two-party negotiation to a more complex interaction including legislators
and the executive power in addition to management and employees. Historically, providers’ organizations have
claimed the right to bargain collectively rather than depend on the regulatory decisions of executives or legislatures
for their labor relations.
5 Furthermore, the combination of these politicization of labor strategies and the job stability of public employees
created ideal conditions for the development of relatively strong union leaders who usually remain in office longer
than the policymakers in these areas.9
administration, the consequence of this process is the politicization of labor unions that need to
lobby governments and legislatures rather than engage in collective bargaining with
management. Finally, the dependence of the general public on their services makes the protests
of public service unions more visible and more sensitive for politicians, who may have a say in
their labor relations through Congress, thus contributing to the use of political strategies by
public service providers
The political strategies of public sector unions are further enhanced by other contextual
conditions that further increase their propensity to strike. First, the relatively high unionization
rates of the public sector in Latin America, either in the form of labor unions or professional
associations (when legal limitations forbid the former) facilitates the organization of collective
action, as argued by Franzosi (1995). Second, public sector employees are usually in the formal
sector and in non-tradable services. In combination with job stability clauses, these two
conditions reduce their exposure to competitive pressures (both domestic and international) and
make them more resilient to the moderating effect of unemployment on wage militancy.
6
Finally, the particular regulation of the public sector usually resulted in the organization
of unions separately from private sector workers, whereas the centralization of social services
concentrated the allocation of resources and induced the centralization of labor organization only
at the sector level, which according to  Calmfors and  Driffil (1988) provokes more labor
militancy than if workers are organized at the national level or company level. Thus, these
organizational features avoid the tempering effect on militancy of encompassing labor
organizations, which are more able to arrange national corporatist arrangements to generate labor
support for institutional changes.
7 Thus, the organizational insulation of public sector workers
and the centralized nature of these organizations increased their incentives for high militancy and
resistance to change.  These contextual characteristics make the resistance of public sector
providers to reforms that are perceived as costly for them more visible and effective than in the
private sector.
                                                       
6 Garrett and Way (1995) found higher militancy in the public sector than in the private sector across a sample of
OECD countries.
7 See Cameron (1984), Haggard and Kaufman (1992), Przeworski (1991), Calmfors and Driffil (1988) on the effect
of encompassing labor organizations. Garrett (1998) argues that encompassing organizations including both private
and public sector workers care more about the general welfare of society.10
1.2  Providers, Organizations and Social Sector Reforms
Considering the aforementioned characteristics of providers organizations, in order to understand
labor-government interactions it is important to focus on perceptions of the distributive costs of
social sector reforms and the incentives of different actors in terms of their agency and their
interaction with policymakers.
8  That is, it is necessary to analyze the policy preferences and
political incentives of policymakers and social actors regarding institutional innovation as well as
other contextual factors that impact on their preferences. In particular, we study the interaction of
reforming governments with the organizations of professional providers of health and education
(i.e., teachers and doctors).
Due to the uncertainty created by institutional innovation, labor unions’ perceptions of
the distributive costs of these institutional reforms are key in understanding their reactions. Labor
unions feel threatened by reforms that reduce their control over promotion and income, and in
some cases, affect their bargaining power by forcing their decentralization. Providers face
challenges such as losing monopolies to new competitors and the introduction of performance
measures threatening their real incomes. Consumers may face transitional costs and uncertainty
about the outcome, but they would receive better service if the reforms are effective. In contrast,
the short-term cost of transition is concentrated on providers, who are usually better organized
than consumers.
Providers’ organizations have two types of concerns regarding these reforms. First, they
represent the claims and fears of their constituencies. Union leaders seek to increase their
affiliates’ market power, employment and income because their success in these tasks influences
the ability of union leaders to remain as workers’ agents, thus keeping their political power.
Second, their organizations face higher transition costs than individuals because they have
developed patterns of action that are hard to change. Hence, the transition costs of providers’
association involve the adaptation of both organizational and individual practices.
Social sector reforms are generally part of the re-organization of public finances, which is
seen by union leaders—and generally also by society—as a way of relinquishing responsibility
in social sectors and a source of layoffs or declining real incomes. Therefore, and besides unions’
eventual acknowledgement of the need for social sector reforms, they perceive a conflict of
                                                       
8 On the distributive consequence of institutions and their impact on the redefinition of the political interest, there is
a large literature inaugurated by Bates (1984), Hall (1986), Moe (1990), and Knight (1992).11
interest between their affiliates’ goals, the society’s and their own. This conflict of interest
permeates their perception of different reforms, such as decentralization, private sector
involvement, or changes in payment structures.
  First, labor unions tend to perceive decentralization as a source of power dilution that
weakens their bargaining power by hindering their capacity to organize national strategies. It also
reduces solidarity among unions in supporting specific protests, which become local,
geographically focused phenomena. Second, they perceive changes in payment mechanisms,
such as those associated with performance as a way to increase competition among their
members, hindering internal solidarity while increasing the probability of lay-offs and
uncertainty about their income.
9 Third, they perceive private involvement providing alternative
sources of supply to the public sector as a challenge that dramatically changes work conditions
and bargaining capacity. The differences between these two sectors are usually larger than
diversity in skills, due to the particular characteristics of the public sector. They also conceive of
private involvement as resulting from the abandonment by the state of its social responsibilities.
This last perception is tied to their ideology of expanding the social responsibilities of the state as
guarantees of social rights.
In sum, social sectors reforms are seen by unions as a source of conflict because they
increase the probability of unemployment, declining income, and higher level of control over
their affiliates while threatening their political sustainability and forcing organizational
adaptation. These effects are particularly relevant in a context of internal economic turmoil and
globalization where unions’ power and strategies are under revision. The following section
focuses on the conditions influencing their resistance or acceptance of reforms, which are related
to their interaction with policymakers and to the context of such interaction.
2  Theoretical Framework: Market Structure and Political Markets
To analyze the interaction between providers’ organizations and policymakers, we use a
theoretical framework including three main elements: (i) the structure of the market affecting the
preferences, incentives, and bargaining power of governments and providers’ organizations; (ii)
the political alignments affecting particular public sector markets; and (iii) the organizational12
structure of unions delimiting their representation and thus, the impact of reforms on their
constituencies as well as their bargaining power vis-à-vis a single employer or multiple
employers.  This section presents the theoretical arguments for using these variables, which are
applied to empirical cases in the following section.
2.1  Market Structure
Reforms in health care and education are applied to markets already established, with their own
organization, rules and relative power of the actors involved, among them government and
unions. The basic characteristics of those original setups, as well as the distribution of interests
and power, affect the impact of the reform, at the same time that they are influenced by it.
Therefore, similar policies may have different consequences, depending on the alternative roles
played in the market where they are applied.
Incentive mechanisms—like any provider payment mechanism or redistribution of roles,
such as decentralization, performance evaluations or private participation—are contracts among
several players. However, these contracts are not isolated; they are applied to contexts with
different characteristics, alternative sets of institutional rules and resource endowments, and
specific union and government reputations. Therefore, different contract structures may impact
differently on various health and education markets. Likewise, a different market context may
alter the effectiveness of a reform and the success of different actors’ strategies. Changes in
incentives have a special impact on social sector reforms because unions and governments, as the
main actors, are themselves agents of workers and voters, respectively, who are the principals of
the reform. Therefore, in order to understand the impact of a certain reform it is relevant to study
not only the goals of the average citizen, but also the objectives of his/her representatives.
10
Therefore, payment mechanisms or any kind of incentives are just one important
component of health and education systems. They, along with other basic conditions (e.g.,
                                                                                                                                                                                  
9 Performance based payments do not assure a fixed salary, but create competition among workers to distribute a
defined budget. Comparative performance may lead to differences in remuneration for similar tasks, alternative
promotion procedures and changes in hiring and firing policies.
10 The economic literature refers to these types of delegation schemes as agency theory. Agency theory considers the
relationship between two actors (principal and agent) where the former delegates on the latter the performance of a
task or service. As the goals of both actors do not match necessarily, and given imperfect chances of monitoring the
agent’s actions, there is room for opportunistic behavior. The topic of opportunistic behavior and contract theory has
been vastly developed by the economic literature. Introductory concepts and discussion can be found in Williamson
(1975, 1985). For a technical development see Hart and  Holmstrom (1987), Hart (1995),  Laffont (1990) and
Sappington (1991), among others.13
infrastructure, health and income patterns, urban concentration) redefine the incentives for
providers. Not only unions, but also hospitals and physicians, and schools and teachers, react to
the new payment mechanisms in different ways, reshaping the structure of markets in education
and health, and affecting their development. The incentives, in turn, modify players’ strategies
and performances in terms of quantity and quality of learning and patient care and length of stay,
among other social sector outputs.
This view is the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, supported by the traditional
industrial organization perspective,
11 which has been used as a referential framework to study
market behavior and changes in incentive mechanisms in a broad sense.
12 According to this
approach, market structure (i.e., number of providers and their market shares, degree of product
differentiation and subcontracting, characteristics of the private sector) determines firm conduct
(price-setting strategies, investments in capital and research and development, advertising
methods), which in turn affects market  performance (efficiency, cost-effectiveness, profits,
equity). Basic conditions, such as  socio-economic and epidemiological patterns, human and
geographical location of factors, simultaneously influence market structure and supplier conduct.
However, it is known that the influences between one element and the others are not always
unidirectional: performance feeds back into structure, and changes in conduct affect the basic
conditions that link with the structure of the market. These aspects, together with the
acknowledgment of each actor’s goals, strategies, and expected outcomes are elements to take
into account  in designing, implementing and interpreting responses to social sectors.
We focus on the characteristics of the market influencing the preference and bargaining
capacity of providers and their organizations with regards to social sector reforms. In particular,
three characteristics have a strong effect on both preferences and bargaining power of providers:
(i) the public-private mix in the provision of social services and employment, (ii) the degree of
development of the market in terms of providers’ capacities and coverage of insurance schemes,
as well as in terms of the epidemiological and educational status of the society, and (iii) the size
of the country.
                                                       
11 Sherer and Ross (1990).
12 Maceira (1998).14
2.2 Political Alignments
Because public sector markets are different from private markets, they are affected by political
variables.  The political character of labor unions and their longstanding role in the definition of
open polities during authoritarian regimes has further reinforced their political identities. This
political character affects their interaction with governments. That is, in addition to their agency
role regarding workers, labor leaders also have political links and ideologies. These political
identities serve as signals both in their interaction with governments and in their relationship
with constituencies, in the cases of inter-union or intra-union competition explained below.
In public sector markets, political alignments affect both the context of the reform and the
interaction between policymakers and unions. Political identities shape the policy preferences of
governments
13 and, in combination with institutional variables, they influence the opportunities
for reform, regardless of providers’ attitudes. That is, if the same political party controls the
presidency and congress (unified government) and there is partisan discipline in Congress, the
government is more likely to pass its social reforms.
14 In contrast, a fragmented party system
with no clear majority or lacking partisan discipline, or a setting where the government is divided
between rival parties controlling different powers, which is not unlikely in a region characterized
by presidential systems, makes reforming more difficult.
15
Because governments have multiple goals and respond to a diversity of principals (e.g.,
voters, legislator, political party), which makes the evaluation of their objectives more difficult,
political alignments also influence the interaction between decision-makers and labor unions.
Governments have multiple goals in implementing social sector reforms (i.e., fiscal, equity,
efficiency, political, participatory). For instance, both Di Gropello (1997: pp. 43-47) and Hanson
(1997: p. 7) find several goals in the implementation of education decentralization in several
Latin American countries, including anti-union goals in the political agenda. In this context,
political alignments can serve as a cue for intentions because providers affiliated with the
                                                       
13 See Garrett (1998) and Boix (1998) for empirical tests of the effect of political identities on policy preferences in
the OECD countries.
14 See Geddes (1994) on the impact of partisan alignments on institutions and institutional change in Latin America.
Corrales (1999) analyzes the effect of partisan links in the relationship between executive and legislative power in
Latin America with regards to educational reform.
15 Mainwaring and Scully (1995) provide a survey of the literature on party systems in Latin America whereas
Mainwaring and Shugart (1999) and Shugart and Carey (1998) summarize the regional literature on presidentialism
with an emphasis on policy impact.15
reforming party are more likely to trust the absence of hidden government agendas in the reform
process.
The commonality of interests created by shared political identities facilitates the
cooperation of organized providers with reformers in the government. In Latin America, a
regional convergence of policy preferences related to the dire economic and social conditions of
the 1980s and the spread of the so-called “Washington consensus” seemed to reduce the effect of
political alignments.
16 However, even in a context of policy convergence, political affiliation can
generate confidence in unlikely policies that would be rejected if they were proposed by another
political party due to longer horizons based on previous interactions that generate trust in the
intentions of the government.
17 Instead, the absence of political alignments increases the distrust
between both parties and makes consensus much more difficult to achieve.
Political alignments also facilitate negotiations because previously established loyalties
provide longer horizons based on a long-term relationship that compensates the time
inconsistencies of institutional bargaining.
18 Additionally, politically generated trust can be
enhanced in the case of organized constituencies with fluid communication channels to the
government, which could be used to persuade them of the need for reform.
Ideology as a signal can also help labor unions to establish alliances with other social
sectors. These alliances can bring social pressure from the voters on the government. Because
public opinion perception of social sector crisis creates incentives for reform among politicians
and unions,
19 both sectors seek to win public favor for their own position, and they can use
ideology to define common goals with other sectors of society. Therefore, and based again on
principal-agent theory, ideology can be used as an instrument for aligning the goals of one agent
and the principal (voters-consumers-workers-other social actors), strengthening the agent’s
bargaining power.
                                                       
16 On the regional convergence, see Torre (1998), Edwards (1995). On the worldwide effect of the “Washington
Consensus,” see Williamson (1994).
17 For instance, Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) model the political advantages of left-wing parties in implementing
right-wing policies based on the trust of their constituencies.
18 The effect of partisan links between labor unions and government officials both for communication and trust are
developed in Murillo (2000).
19 Geddes (1994) argues that politicians will only commit to institutional reform if there is a social demand that
creates electoral incentives for them.16
2.1 Organizational Characteristics
Political alignments interact with organizational features as well. Even in the presence of partisan
allegiances, the existence of inter-union competition and intra-union leadership competition also
affects the relationship with the reforming policymakers.
20
Cooperation with political allies can be enforced if the organization is centralized. On the
other hand, it would be difficult to achieve cooperation if the providers include multiple
competing organizations that cannot coordinate their actions. The organizational fragmentation
provoked by inter-union competition weakens their capacity to exercise policy input.
Fragmentation into a multiplicity of unions makes the coordination of their collective action
more difficult due to inter-union competition for members. As a result, competing unions are
weaker and have problems establishing sustainable agreements in their bargaining with the
government. In the case of negotiations, inter-union competition allows the government to
choose allies in the negotiation process among the competing unions and to benefit a particular
set of providers at the expense of others whose resistance becomes more ineffectual. More likely,
though, coordination problems make bargaining more difficult, leading to resistance as a more
probable outcome. The different demands of each organization and the temptation to present
diverse strategies to differentiate each organization and attract followers make any consensus
harder to achieve. Hence, inter-union competition makes coordination of collective action among
the rival organizations more difficult, and especially if it coincides with partisan or ideological
differences that broaden the breach among them. Thus, it reduces the bargaining power of
providers’ organizations and makes consensus more difficult to achieve.
Intra-union competition for leadership also affects the interaction between providers and
governments. In a context of high uncertainty about the outcome of reforms, where providers
feel threatened by the new policies, the status quo bias provokes contenders for leadership to be
more militant than incumbents, in particular if the contenders have no political links with the
government. Ideological differences often exacerbate intra-union competition for leadership. For
that reason, a context of intra-union competition for leadership often makes even cooperative
union leaders more militant because they are afraid of being replaced by anti-reform contenders.
In this case, the internal politics of the union becomes enmeshed with the union-government
interaction and makes it more difficult to achieve consensus regarding institutional changes.17
Finally, the organizational structure of the union shapes the impact of different reforms.
That is, the degree of centralization of a union affects its capacity to adapt to new decentralized
environments due to its differential impact on the internal balance of power between national and
subnational organizations or parts within a single federative union. National agreements by
centralized and monopolistic unions are easier to obtain, as pointed out by the  corporatist
literature. In particular, monopolistic unions are shielded from the debilitating effect of inter-
union competition. Centralized organizations, however, feel more threatened by reforms that
reallocate the power of decision-making to smaller units and increase heterogeneity among their
large constituencies. The former hinders their central authority and the latter makes collective
action and solidarity more difficult for their organizations to achieve.
To sum up, based on the theoretical arguments presented here we develop a set of
expectations regarding the interaction between providers’ organizations and policymakers.
Hence, in a comparative context of reform, the outcome of the government-union interaction
may differ based on different political conditions related both to the context and the interaction
itself, with independent effects. The expectations derived from the hypothesized effects of the
variables are the following:
a) Effects derived from the structure of the market:
1) Teachers’ unions should be more active in facing reforms than physicians’  associations,
because education services are relatively more concentrated in the public sector than health care
services, and also because physicians, as workers in a highly mixed (public-private) system have
a more diversified wage structure and are therefore less constrained by public reforms;
2) Relatively more developed markets in terms of organization of providers, hospitals, schools
and insurance schemes, should have a higher level of risk transfer to social sector workers,
reducing their abilities to response to social reforms;
21
3) Smaller countries should have relatively greater negotiating power than larger countries in
imposing social sector reforms because of power concentration. Additionally, in large federal
countries the number of veto points, and potential allies for providers resisting reforms also
grows further, thus reducing the power of reforming governments (Tsebelis, 1990).
                                                                                                                                                                                  
20 See Murillo (2000) for a more extensive discussion on the effects of inter-union and intra-union competition.
21 For an analysis of market structure and risk transfer in health care, see Maceira and Poblete (2000).18
b)  Effects derived from political alignments and institutional context:
1) Unified governments and partisan discipline in Congress should facilitate the implementation
of social sector reforms by reducing the number of potential conflicts to be confronted by the
government;
2) Political alignments between public sector unions and the government should facilitate
bargaining and cooperation between both parties by increasing the trust of unions and providing
formal channels of communication.
c)  Effects derived from the organizational characteristics of provider organizations:
1) Centralized unions should facilitate bargaining between providers and the government and
strengthen their bargaining power to participate in the reform. However, centralized unions are
more likely to resist administrative decentralization for its effect on their internal distribution of
power;
2) Inter-union competition should make bargaining more difficult and more likely to be broken
by militancy while weakening the bargaining power of unions;
3) Intra-union competition should mitigate the effect of political alignments by increasing the
incentives for differentiation among union leaders, thereby making cooperation more difficult
and militancy more likely.
The next section illustrates how these variables affect the distribution of costs of social
sector reform and union reactions to them, using empirical evidence from the reform experiences
of a variety of Latin American countries.
3 Empirical Cases of Providers’ Reactions to Social Sector Reforms
3.1. Decentralization
The centralization of social services has promoted concentration in the allocation of resources
and the creation of bilateral monopolies for collective bargaining. In addition, centralization
generally reduces the chances of monitoring social sectors’ performance by increasing
bureaucratic layers between principal and agents.
22 As a result, administrative decentralization
                                                       
22 Hausmann (1995).19
would imply a territorial reallocation of resources and power within the bureaucracy in charge of
service provision, as well as the opportunity to develop monitoring channels.
According to the framework developed in the prior section, it is expected that
decentralization will be easier to implement, despite unions’ resistance, in more developed
markets, where public authorities have relatively higher bargaining power. This resistance from
unions/associations will be supported by the fact that decentralization can be seen as a transfer of
financial risks from the central government to weaker local authorities, which in turn will affect
wages and job stability. In addition, and also based on the “market structure” hypotheses
introduced above, resistance to decentralization would be stronger among teachers than among
physicians. The reason is associated with teachers’ higher dependence on public wages, in
contrast to more diversified sources of income in health care markets.
“Organizational variables” would also be important in explaining unions’ behavior under
a decentralization policy, because territorial reallocation of resources tends to fragment
centralized organizations, weakening their bargaining power and the authority of national
leadership. Therefore, centralized unions are likely to resist decentralization for fear of losing
bargaining power by virtue of the dispersion of decision making to the local level. In contrast,
local unions/associations are more likely to support a decentralization process that increases their
internal influence and discretion over the definition of work rules and income, except in cases
where decentralization is associated with a decline in their membership’s real income. However,
“political alignments” can permeate the union-government interaction regardless of the effect of
reforms on providers’ organizations because union leaders interact in a political setting and
decentralization shifts the context of interaction with employers that are politically defined at
different levels of government.
According to the experiences  observed, most teachers’ organizations perceived
administrative decentralization as a cost-cutting mechanism used to transfer financial
responsibility from the national government to the provincial level, thus affecting the income of
their constituencies.
23 However, because education is mainly in the public sector, political
alignments were more important in defining the reaction of the union than what organizational
variables would have predicted. Physicians’ organizations, by contrast, showed relatively lower
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decentralization confirms teachers’ fears about government goals (Di Gropello 1997).20
resistance to decentralization, as well as a reduced degree of power concentration, especially in
more developed countries, with federal structures and/or more diversified health care systems in
terms of their public-private mix in the financing of services. The cases observed also suggest
that countries with less sophisticated health insurance structures are more active in opposing
decentralization, as is seen in Central American nations.
An example of political alignment and union centralization in a relatively big educational
market is Argentina. The decentralized nature of the largest teacher union, CTERA (Teachers’
Confederation of the Argentine Republic), a confederation of provincial unions, reduced the
impact of the 1992 reform on its internal structure. In contrast, those unions restricted to teachers
at the national level risked their membership due to the transfer of teachers to the provinces.
However, political alignments played a key role in explaining the public opposition of CTERA
to the transfer of teachers to the provinces without financial guarantees for their salaries.
CTERA, rather than the centralized teachers’ unions, led the resistance to decentralization due to
its lack of political alignment with the national government. Indeed, due to their political
opposition to the government, CTERA’s union leaders founded a new peak labor confederation
with other opposition unions. However, inter-union competition between CTERA and the other
teachers’ unions hindered negotiations. As a result, the union had little input in defining the new
policy.
Political alignment in combination with organizational monopoly also played a key role
in Mexico and Colombia. The Mexican SNTE (National Union of Education Workers) and the
FECODE (Colombian Federation of Teachers) were centralized unions that opposed
administrative decentralization. In both cases, the political alignment of the unions favored
negotiations, and both organizations established participatory mechanisms for the discussion of
educational reform. As a result, both organizations took advantage of their monopolistic position
and cooperated with inputs into the final design of the reforms. In Colombia,  FECODE
successfully pressed legislators to include some financial concessions in the legal transfer of
resources to the  subnational levels, whereas the Mexican  SNTE received guarantees on the
allocation of resources for teachers’ salaries at the  subnational level. Additional concessions
involved salary hikes and subsidies for teachers. In both cases, concessions were only achieved
after teachers’ protests that were in part originated by intra-union competition. In these cases,21
intra-union competition made policymakers more willing to bargain with moderate leaders
politically aligned with them.
Decentralization in health care was widespread throughout the region, with relatively
lower resistance from physicians’ chambers as compared to teachers’ organizations. In several
cases, physician professional associations participated in the discussions of the reform (i.e.,
Chile, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua), although their impact was relatively weaker
than that of teachers. The information collected supports the “market structure” hypothesis that
associates the involvement of doctors’ chambers and teachers’ unions with their relative
diversification in sources of income. In the case of health care services, the provision is much
more fragmented than in education, where the core services are in the public sector.  Also, within
health care markets, relatively poor countries account for much simpler financing schemes,
especially because of the lack of insurance plans and payment mechanisms associated with
performance. Health care in Latin America is spread among public, social security and private
services, and physicians, the main actors in the provision of care, generally hold posts in more
than one sector at the same time. Under this framework, physicians belong to public health
centers for academic or curricula reasons rather than for income motives. In Latin American
health care services, the private sector is doctors’ main source of income, and private care
constitutes a significant share of total expenditures on health. Public facilities provide physicians
with a basic wage and the chance to organize a clientele and a peer group of professionals.
Therefore, they have few incentives to participate in negotiations related to public health
decentralization.
In addition, health care workers are not unified in their demands, and two different
groups can be identified: one representing the physicians, and the other representing the rest of
health care personnel. The first is organized in professional associations, with goals and social
characteristics differentiated from the second group. Physicians’ viewpoints are more related to
the organization of the “model of health care provision,” and their interventions are associated
with the design of a basic package of services rather than issues such as wages or employment
levels. The second group of workers is much weaker, especially because there are no strategic
alliances between them and physicians’ organizations. In the Latin American experience, the
coordination between both groups is not effective and, with the exception of Uruguay and some22
municipalities in Argentina, where the physicians are organized as a trade union, doctors do not
have strong participation in reforms related to decentralization.
However, a comparative analysis of decentralization processes in health care services in
Latin America shows that decentralization has proven to be extremely difficult to implement, but
for reasons other than the resistance of providers’ organization, such as the shortage of
managerial abilities at the local level to carry out the reforms. Indeed, in many cases,
decentralization is restricted to deconcentration, where the status of the health care personnel is
not fully affected. In the cases where decentralization was more deeply implemented, it was
associated either with a longer tradition in federal government, as in the cases of Argentina or
Brazil, or with strong participation by multilateral institutions, not always coordinated, as in the
cases of Bolivia and the Dominican Republic.
In short, the evidence collected suggests that the variables presented in the prior section
related to market structure, political alignment and unions’ internal organization are useful in
explaining unions’ and physician groups’ reaction to decentralization. However, the influence of
each of them differs.  First, the importance of the public sector as the main employer and the
principal source of income triggered higher participation by teachers than physicians. In addition,
the higher the public-private mix in the financing and provision of services, the lower is the
effect on providers and the incentive to organize collective action in that regard. This behavior is
seen within the health care sector, when countries with more developed health insurance plans
are compared with smaller, more fee-for-service oriented private health systems. Although these
conclusions can be expanded to other types of reforms, the regional experience in
decentralization, especially in health, has proven to be more associated with an administrative
deconcentration of roles rather than a redefinition of financial sources, which might affect the
participation of unions.
In addition, if the state is the main employer, the effect of these reforms on providers is
stronger and the impact of political alignments on a public sector market increases. Hence,
political alignments explain the reaction of teachers’ unions to this reform although  their
organizational structure, and to a certain extent intra-union competition, affected their bargaining
power. On the other hand, physicians’ organizations, which are less associated with the public
sector, do not generally have strong political alignments to the government.23
3.2. Provider Payment Mechanisms
The previous politicization of appointment decisions in the public sector and the limits to
collective bargaining in many countries of the region brought labor unions to seek rule-bound
measures for insulating their income and employment from the variation of demand and political
context.  Yet, these rules, such as seniority, are contradictory with rewards to performance
included through new provider payment mechanisms. Hence, new payment mechanisms are
perceived as increasing the management discretion at the expense of rules that protect members
with the longest commitment.
24
Provider organizations that support rule-bound income and employment for all their
members resist new payment mechanisms increasing management discretion. They are afraid of
the difficulty in controlling discretion that might be used to implement hidden agendas hurting
their affiliates. Additionally, they fear that by increasing the heterogeneity of their membership
and introducing competition among employees for non-fixed income, new payment mechanisms
would affect aggregation and collective action.
In health care reforms, changes proposed in provider payment mechanisms provoke two
different types of reactions. These different reactions are related to the characteristics of the
contracts and incentives proposed by the reform and the private sector involvement in the
provision of care, which is directly associated to the “market structure” hypotheses presented in
Section 2.
The first and more characteristic reaction to the reform comes from physicians working
in public hospitals and health care centers, who are opposed to the reform. The perception is that
changes in payment mechanisms (e.g., switching from fixed wages to salaries associated with
performance) are related to cost-reduction reforms and threaten the norm of guaranteed stability
for public workers. Additionally, changes in payment mechanisms involve not only remuneration
methods but also a redefinition in the allocation of resources, as well as in the structure of
management and monitoring of results within the health center.
This fact constitutes the main difference between a decentralization process and a change
in payment schemes. Decentralization is associated with a jurisdictional issue and involves
negotiations between the national government on one side, and the local authority (state,24
municipal) on the other. In this case, health care providers are witnesses of a reallocation of
funds and responsibilities among jurisdictions. In contrast, a modification of the payment
mechanism alters the relation between the financier of the service and the provider. It involves
not only health care personnel, but also the allocation of resources to public facilities, which
implies a political decision on how to provide health care services and has a stronger effect on
health care providers.
These changes in payment mechanism were difficult to implement, however, even in
those cases where health care reforms were ambitious and widespread. In the case of Colombia,
where the reform has had a strong demand-driven orientation, payment mechanisms in public
hospitals remain mainly based on historical budgets and fixed wages, in spite of efforts to
implement a social insurance scheme based on demand-side incentives. Chile, an important
regional example of public health reform,  has undertaken a sequential expense-registration
strategy to change payments from fixed wages and budgets to incentive-driven wages. However,
this policy has not yet been fully implemented and is currently under revision. In other cases,
where decentralization/deconcentration type reforms are under implementation, payment
mechanisms are still pending. In these cases, though, health centers rather than health care
providers were the main obstacles to the effective implementation of the reform.
In all cases—not only within the facilities under the control of the ministry of health, but
also those owned by the social security institutes—physician associations in Honduras,
Dominican Republic, Chile, and Argentina, among other countries, participate in the discussion
about health care reform, reinforcing their interest in improving the organization of the system.
However, they are critical about the linkages between changes in payment structures and health
care outputs for two main reasons: (a) the correlation between poor health results and shortage of
financial resources, and (b) the perception that changes in payment mechanisms associated with
performance are linked to losing their stability as public workers and/or the decline of their
income.
The second type of reaction associated with changes in payment mechanisms occurs
where public or social security financiers switch payments from fee-for-service to capitation or
per case modes. Providers in this case are mainly private, and the reactions of physicians are
                                                                                                                                                                                  
24 Such rules also reduced the opportunity of managers to politicize the use of discretion in discriminating against
providers who are unionized or have a different political ideology. Golden (1998) shows the use of seniority rules to
avoid the targeting of unionized workers while downsizing in the private sector.25
associated with their relative market power, not only in relation to financiers but also in terms of
hospitals’ bargaining abilities. The higher the level of development (in terms of size and product
differentiation) in health care markets, the higher the relative power of health care providers
(hospitals and clinics) over physicians. Therefore, changes in payment mechanisms toward
capitation contribute not only to transfer financial risks from the payers to the providers, but may
also constitute a shift of risks one step down in the provision of care. Hence, the more developed
and diversified the market, the lower the power of physicians’ associations and the higher the
probability of risk transfers. In contrast, the less developed health care markets (e.g., in rural
areas) or the more specific the medical technique involved (e.g., anesthesiology).  the higher
physicians’ “market power.” Therefore, changes in payment mechanisms are less frequent and
the transfer of risks to doctors is lower in the latter cases.
In those countries in the region where the development of health  maintenance
organizations, generally associated with economic development, is relatively high, doctors’
bargaining power is lower. Social security systems in Argentina (PAMI, provincial social
security institutes) were able to shift towards capitation payment schemes transferring risks to
doctors. However, the development of health markets also explains variations within Argentina.
In the province of Mendoza, for example, changes in payment mechanisms and risk transfer from
hospitals to physicians were higher in the city capital than in smaller urban centers, such as San
Rafael or San Martin, where the Círculos Médicos (the association of doctors) still maintain
higher bargaining power relative to the Association of Hospitals and were able to resist the
changes. The same situation is found in Uruguay, where doctors’ market power is stronger
outside of Montevideo. In 1997 doctors attempted to block, through strikes and other means, a
proposed reallocation of physicians within Montevideo public facilities. However, the unions’
political alignment with the  Frente  Amplio (Broad Front), which governed Montevideo,
contributed to the acceptance of the reforms.
These experiences show a strong association between market structure and the
participation of doctors’ associations in health reforms based on changes in provider payments.
The size of the market, as well as its level of development, shapes the bargaining power of each
party, thus affecting the impact of the reform. However, political variables associated with
unions’ internal organization and political alignment do not have a strong influence on the
reform process. As discussed above, the bias in favor of market variables instead of political26
variables might be related to the structure of health care provision in Latin America, which is
based on a mixed financing system, more exposed to market-intensive interactions.
The reactions of teachers’ unions, however, follow a pattern similar to the one discussed
in the section devoted to decentralization. In this case, a strong public presence defines unions’
activities as associated mainly with political alignment and their internal organization with lower
influence of market variables.
  The Mexican SNTE supported the introduction of new payment mechanisms because it
allowed teachers to increase their real income, which had been depressed by centralized wage
bargaining with ceilings during the 1980s. The political alignment of the  SNTE national
leadership and the incumbent PRI facilitated the negotiation. At the same time, the previous
decline of teachers’ salaries and the financial guarantees assumed by the national government
made this reform more palatable for the union.
In Chile, changes in payment mechanism were imposed by a non-democratic regime that
did not allow teachers’ resistance. However, from the democratic transition of 1990 to 1996, the
Colegio de Profesores, A.G.
25 was controlled by leaders aligned politically with the incumbent
governments of the Concertación (Socialists and Christian Democrats). As a result, it had a very
fluid relationship with the Ministry of Education in the definition of institutional innovation, thus
accepting the design of payment mechanisms. Political variables, though, started to play a role in
1996, when a leader affiliated with the Communist party gained control of the union. The
organization became more militant, organizing general strikes in 1996 and 1998, and demanded
participation in the mechanisms for teacher evaluation affecting the distribution of performance
rewards.  The monopolistic conditions of the teachers’ association increased its bargaining power
and brought about concessions, including changes in the system of teacher evaluation to include
union input, the revision of temporary contracts, changes in criteria for evaluating teachers, and a
law to cover costs of teacher training.
According to the experiences brought in this section, the comparison of workers’
reactions in health and education follows a pattern similar to that displayed for decentralization.
The higher the level of development of markets for social services, in terms of private
participation and product differentiation, the lower the involvement and effectiveness of unions’
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participation. At one extreme, education markets and health care sectors in relatively less
developed countries had relatively higher union involvement and fewer changes in provider
payment schemes. As in the decentralization case, market  structure—and economic
development—affect the interaction between unions and reforms whereas political variables,
associated with alignment and unions’ internal organization, are relevant only in education.
3.3 Evaluation Mechanisms
The introduction of measures that account for students’ performance facilitates monitoring of
teachers, although there are several factors, other than  teachers’ participation and schools’
actions, affecting the learning process. As a result, labor unions are likely to distrust the impact
of tests that do not consider socioeconomic or contextual variables in the learning process. If
they perceive that the test will be used for measuring their performance in order to define their
income, they are likely to resist it.  In particular, teachers are afraid to be perceived as the single
factor shaping students’ performance in exams that do not consider socioeconomic, geographic
and cultural heterogeneity. As expressed by the Regional Committee of Education International
for Latin America (IEAL), teachers’ unions fear that standardized tests ignore the diversity of
conditions in which teachers work and the effect of social inequalities on the learning process.
Additionally, the  IEAL criticizes that exams do not measure  factors other than curriculum
content such as teaching effort and enthusiasm (Colegio de Profesores, 2000).
The establishment of evaluation tests generates less open opposition from teacher unions
than other institutional reforms in most countries of the region. Political alignments and
organizational variables have weaker effects because testing is part of a more technical
discussion with a microeconomic impact on teachers’ labor relations. In large and heterogeneous
countries where the impact of other variables on student performance is clearer, teachers’ unions
are less resistant to exams than those in homogeneous countries. In large countries with more
developed education systems, such as Argentina, Chile and Mexico, the unions accepted the test
while demanding more participation in setting performance criteria.
 In contrast, in smaller and more homogeneous countries, teachers’ unions presented a
stronger opposition to the establishment of exams. Despite a close political relationship between
the administration of  Leonel  Fernández and the monopolistic teachers’ union (ADP or
Dominican Teachers’ Association) in the Dominican Republic, the ADP resisted exams. In Costa28
Rica,  ANDE (National Association of Teachers) shares the representation of teachers with
various smaller teacher unions. This was a pluralistic union, although politically aligned with the
Social-Christian government. It had an active participation in a consensual process organized by
the Ministry of Education, which resulted in the reform proposal for the sector. Although ANDE
agreed on the need to create an evaluation system for students, it rejected the government
proposal, which did not include union representatives in the evaluation committee. In both small
countries—the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica—teacher unions rejected evaluations that
could be more clearly linked to their performance, even when they shared political alignments
with the government.
Because this policy has a stronger effect on providers than on providers’ organizations,
the influence of market structure is stronger than that of political alignments or organizational
structure. Hence, the size of the market seems to be more important than political alignments or
organizational structure regarding this policy. In small nations, unions probably have closer
control of their members and their work with students. In larger countries the variation in student
performance associated with other factors is probably larger, reducing the risk of direct
relationship between exams and performance-based payment mechanisms.
3.4 Private Provision
The introduction of new sources of supply or insurance also challenged labor organizations that
had traditionally concentrated their efforts on pressuring a single public employer regarding
income and working conditions. The introduction of private supply increases diversity among
providers’ industrial relations and makes it harder to define common goals for their unions.
Hence, it not only affects job conditions but also the functioning of providers’ organizations.
The difference in working conditions in the public and private sector is larger, for the
most part, than the diversity in skills of teachers and doctors who perform activities in one or
both sectors.  As a result, employers have incentives not only to attract employees who have less
power to homogenize their work conditions, but also to find alternative ways to transfer the
financial risk to them. In the case of health care services, the interaction of public and private
actors (not only financiers, but also health centers and health professionals) is such that a change
in contracting modes among actors triggers an array of reactions in doctors’ and health centers’
associations, some of them already discussed in the section above on payment mechanisms.29
Additionally, the reallocation of the education budget from public to private schools impacts on
the income of public sector teachers and even on their employment conditions (e.g., effect of
vouchers on educational demand).
Under this framework, the inclusion of private providers in the network of publicly
financed institutions introduces a redefinition of the role played by unions and professional
associations. Clearly, the structure of the market has an important part in the new framework,
and the section devoted to changes in provider payment mechanisms, which include the
participation of private providers, shows some of the regional experiences. Variables related to
the internal organization of unions also play a role, because the introduction of competition from
private suppliers increases heterogeneity among workers and often fosters the organizational
distinction of affiliates gathered by diverse labor unions. In particular, the existence of separate
public and private sector unions would create resistance from public unions and support from
their private counterparts in their competition for members. This competition should be stronger
in education than in health care because teachers usually derive their main source of income
from one of the two sectors and there are usually different unions for private and public teachers.
In contrast, doctors are mostly employed both in the public and the private sector at the same
time, and they are organized in the same professional association.
Finally, political alignments shape the union-government interaction because private
provision of education has traditionally been associated with strong ideological debates about the
State’s social responsibilities and the non-religious character of public education.  This
ideological effect is combined with difficulties in unionizing private sector teachers due to the
combined effect of employers’ distrust and religious influence. As a result, public teachers’
unions are concerned about the effects of private provision of education, whereas private sector
teachers can expand their membership with the growth of private education.
In Colombia and Venezuela, public teachers’ unions opposed the expansion of the private
sector.  The Colombian FECODE resisted the participation of private schools for the extension
of education coverage and so did all Venezuelan teacher unions during the Pérez administration
despite their inter-union competition. In both cases, they resisted subsidies to private provision,
claiming not only negative effects for the job stability and work conditions of their members, but
also a retrenchment of the state’s social responsibility in guaranteeing a free, universal and non-30
religious education. Ideology and the distribution of the education budget between the private
and public sector explain union reactions in these cases.
 Most dramatic is the effect of political alignments and private provision in education in
El Salvador, where inter-union competition weakened the resisting union. The government
established an innovative system of school administration to cover the rural areas, called
EDUCO, where the state granted the administration of the school to communities, which
organized the schools. The ANDES 21 de Junio (National Association of Teachers) is the largest
union and the most representative in the elections of teacher career boards. It is politically
associated with the opposition  FMLN (Farabundo  Martí Front for the National Liberation),
whereas the other two unions, Concertación Magisterial and SIMES (Union of Salvadorean
Teachers) are associated with the Center Democratic Party and the right-wing ARENA,
respectively. Political and ideological alignments were very strong in this case. Not only the
ANDES, but also the union of private teachers (SGEPES) allied with ANDES resisted the
EDUCO program as an implicit privatization of education. The response of the government also
reflected political alignments. The Labor Minister classified EDUCO teachers as belonging to
the public rather than to the private sector, thus reducing their collective rights. As a response,
most of these teachers joined Concertación Magisterial rather than its competitor ANDES 21 de
Junio. Thus, the fragmentation of teachers’ organization reduced the bargaining power of
ANDES and allowed the government to gain labor allies.
In all cases, political alignment variables and inter/intra union organization played an
important role in shaping unions’ reactions to reforms based on private sector participation.
Indeed, the most dramatic growth of private sector provision was experienced in Chile where the
reform, which included competition between private and public provision, was imposed by a
non-democratic regime, thus repressing the effect of ideological opposition from teachers’
unions.
In contrast, in health care, market variables play a stronger role because most systems
already include a private-public mix, which is devoid of the ideological content implicit in
education. In health care services, the characteristic public-private mix in the financing and
provision of services has created a dual system in which physicians hold jobs in both sectors.
Despite the fact that many reform plans incorporate the possibility of subcontracting private
facilities by public financiers (Brazil is a paradigmatic example, and more recently Nicaragua31
and Bolivia through alternative forms of social insurance modes), such a case is extremely rare in
the region, and strong union opposition was not registered.
The Colombian case shows a reform indirectly related to private-public coordination,
which includes decentralization combined with a change in insurance schemes. In that case,
health workers kept in strike during nine months, although their demands were associated not
only with the effects of reform, but also with a cut in payments from the Ministry of Health.
Finally, the exchange involved doctors’ acceptance of the reform in return for the payment of a-
year delay in salaries. The Colombian example follows the logic of a mixed public-private
system: physicians, as participants in both sectors, facing a financial reorganization in the
provision of care, reacted by defending mainly public-job stability and wages, without opposing
the structure of the reform. As in the cases discussed before, the participation of doctors in both
types of services, public and private, loosened their resistance to the change.
Argentina presents a very special case of private participation and union involvement.
More than sixty percent of the Argentine population is covered by one of the many  Obras
Sociales, the social health insurance schemes managed by unions, and divided by branch of
activity. Thus unions in general, and not only those related to the provision of social services, are
involved in social sector reforms, increasing their ability to influence policy makers. The
existence of these health funds created an additional interest in the general unions due to the
financial and organizational resources provided by these funds. During President  Menem’s
administration, a proposed competition system among social insurance institutions and between
them and private insurance schemes challenged the monopolies on union-run health funds. As a
result, the unions used their political alignment with the government and obtained a limitation of
competition for health insurance to union-run health funds only, except for managerial
employees, and even this limited reform was delayed for three years and compensated with
monetary subsidies to modernize their health funds. Private insurance, in this case, did not affect
the union of health workers or doctors’ associations with membership in both the public and the
private sector (Murillo, 1996). Despite this, and as shown in Maceira and Poblete (2000), the
participation of unions in the provision of health care reproduces the strategies and reactions
related to market structure discussed in this paper. In that sense, Obras Sociales with higher
bargaining power in the financing of services are the ones that triggered reforms in the health
care sector, changing incentives and affecting private providers’ strategy to supply services and32
transfer risks in the chain of health care. In this exceptional case, thus, political alignments
allowed unions in general to delay and shape the competition from private suppliers in a publicly
financed but union-run health insurance system.
4.  Conclusions
4.1 Summary
Providers have large stakes in the character of the reform and are well-organized relative to
beneficiaries, making their attitudes and actions important for the success of reforms. Indeed,
because improvements in quality and performance in labor intensive sectors, such as education
and primary health care, require the active collaboration of providers, their involvement and
support for the process is fundamental. For that reason, even if providers do not have the reform
initiative and are not an obvious part of a winning coalition, governments can resort to
concessions to avoid their veto to reforms in order to make their implementation more effective.
Concessions, however, can modify the effect sought in the reforms that they facilitate.
Alternatively, reforming governments can include input from providers in the process of
institutional definition to preempt their resistance. In particular, if they are included with clients
in a broad process of consultation, their particular interests may be tempered.
26 For those reasons,
it is important to analyze which conditions affect providers attitudes towards bargaining or
opposition to reforms in order to suggest some policy options to include them as participants in
social sector reforms.
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that two main factors influence the reaction
of unions to social sectors reforms: the organization of the market (size, level of development
and competition), and political and organizational variables associated with historical events in
the evolution of unions, which define the ability of workers’ representatives to collude and to
cooperate among themselves and with the government. Figure 1 presents these main findings.
According to them, however, unions involvement in social sector reforms are defined by factors,
at least in the short run, which are exogenous to policy makers.
                                                       
26 An example of the impact of broad dialogue is the educational reform of the Dominican Republic, where civil
society played a key role in bringing both the teachers’ union (ADP) and the government to the bargaining table.33
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The size of the country and the institutional context affect the capacity of the government
to pass a reform by shaping its grip on potential opposition from other social groups and political
parties. At the same time, our examples show that the factors with a stronger effect on the
interaction between reforming governing and providers’ organizations, although different for
health and education, tend to be exogenous to institutional design. The effect of inherited market
structures was key in explaining both attitudes and bargaining power of doctors whose income
comes from a combination of the public and private markets. Additionally, the level of
development of those markets has a strong effect on the bargaining power of doctors vis-à-vis
health centers in negotiations regarding institutional reforms transferring risks to providers.  In
contrast, teachers, for the most part, are dedicated to one of the two sectors full-time, and most of
them derive their income from the public sector. As a result, the market structure is dominated by
the characteristics of the governments as employers and the organizational features of teachers’
associations. Hence, political alignment and organizational features have a stronger impact on
attitudes and bargaining power in education than in the health sector.
Table 1 shows that, in addition to the tendency created by sectoral differences, there was
a certain variation across institutional reforms within the sector This variation is related to the
distribution of reform costs between providers and providers’ organizations in the case of
education, where public employment prevails. In the cases where providers’ organizations
concentrated the costs (e.g., decentralization), political alignments prevail, but when providers
were mostly affected (e.g., evaluation), market structure was more important. Additionally, the
inclusion of unions in the administration of health insurance gives more prevalence to political
alignments even for health care.
Table 1. Variables with Strong Influence on Union-Government Interaction










Decentralization Doctors Doctors Teachers Teachers
Payment Mechanism Doctors Doctors Teachers Teachers
Evaluation Teachers Teachers
Private Provision Doctors Doctors Teachers Teachers/ Health
(Argentina)35
4.2 Policy Implications
The market structure of social sectors and economic development provides the context where
reforms are applied, and union organization influences the strategies followed by union leaders.
Nevertheless, there is room for policy interventions, which are related to the main political and
economic issues introduced in the prior discussion. These are associated with the agency concept
of alignment of agents’ goals with those of the principal’s and the definition of regulatory
frameworks providing unions with incentives to cooperate in the reform process.
Hence, considering the difficulty for policymakers in modifying exogenous contextual
variables, such as level of market development and political alignments, we suggest that
policymakers should consider alternatives that generate incentives for aligning the objectives of
providers with those of reformers to facilitate institutional change. In particular, regulations
could be used to change the incentives of providers and to affect the market structure in which
they perform, in order to induce the participation of providers in the process of reform.
As an example of this type of strategy, we propose aligning the incentives of providers
with those of reformers by granting collective rights to public sector workers to make them
participant actors in the processes of reform that affect their labor relations. There is a long
regional tradition of limiting collective bargaining in these sectors, which are left to be defined
by regulators and separated from other service workers. We instead propose making them more
similar to other service workers by granting them bargaining rights in order to involve them as
participants in both the reform process and the definition of their own working conditions, as
well as promotions and evaluations. The terms of their involvement could therefore be defined in
more technical ways to avoid the politicization of their militancy—that is, focusing bargaining
on concrete and technical issues that could be agreed upon despite ideological differences.
We propose linking this change in status to the institutional reforms related to
performance in the social sector. By involving unions in the process of reform and making them
effective representatives of providers—including through means such as electoral regulations
that guarantee their representativeness—governments can align the objectives of the reform with
those of providers. Additionally, the effect of these regulations on the organization of providers
is likely to reshape the structure of provision at the same time as institutional reforms promote
performance-oriented behavior. Thus, it is necessary to link both objectives to increase
providers’ understanding of reforms and to reduce their distrust of hidden agendas that provokes36
so much opposition to the reform process. Additionally, this strategy would provide unions with
more control over their income, even under budgetary constraints.
In the cases of both labor unions and professional associations, another alternative is to
align the interest of providers by granting them not only a representative role, which becomes
more important in the more developed markets, but also a regulatory role. They can be included
in areas such as evaluation, entry exams to the profession, and overseeing roles related to the
performance of providers in a public manner that links the interests of providers, management
and users of the services. In particular, their role as overseers and evaluators of entrance into the
market can help guarantee a certain level of performance, thereby linking providers’ associations
and professional prestige with reforms to improve their performance. It is important to consider,
though, that the risk of this strategy, which can increase support for reforms, is to introduce
distortions if markets are not regulated.
In short, after exposing the exogenous variables explaining the reactions of providers’
organizations to social sector reforms (i.e., market structures, political alignments, and
organizational features), we suggest using regulatory reforms to align the incentives of providers
and policymakers. This strategy can be used to facilitate consensual reforms, improve
performance, and enhance the professional prestige of providers, thus, providing subjective
incentives for better quality to social service providers.37
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